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Abstract 
Recent decades have witnessed increased interest in evolutionary psychological 
explanations of all manner of human behavior.  An example of this increased interest can be 
seen in Durrant and Ward (2012), who call for a more appreciation and systematic 
integration of evolutionary explanations in criminology.  A central platform of their proposal 
assumes that the key to any adequate evolutionary explanation of human behavior is the 
causal presence of evolved psychological mechanisms.  We contend, however, that any 
account of human behavior – criminological or otherwise – that relies on “psychological 
mechanisms” to account for either the transmission of psychological entities across 
generations or the current existence of such entities cannot in principle succeed because 
such explanations reflect a fundamental confusion between metaphors and mechanisms. 
 
 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a veritable explosion of interest in evolutionary 
psychology and the attempt to explain all manner of human behavior in fundamentally 
evolutionary terms (see, e.g., Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2001; Boakes, 1984; Buss, 1999, 
2005; Crawford & Krebs, 2008; Dennett, 2006; Forgas, Haselton, & von Hippel, 2007).  
Drawing inspiration from the Darwinian theory of natural selection, many evolutionary 
psychologists argue that “all behavior owes its existence to underlying psychological Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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mechanisms” and that the central task of an evolutionarily informed social science is to 
“discover, describe, and explain the nature of those mechanisms” (Buss, 1995, p. 6).  
Consequently, evolutionary theorists have worked diligently to definitively identify the 
various “evolved psychological mechanisms” that would presumably account for the wide 
range of human cognitive, emotional, and social behavior.   
One clear example of this strategy can be seen in the work of Durrant and Ward 
(2012) featured in this volume.  These authors call for a “measured consideration of the role 
of evolutionary explanations in criminology” (p. 4), citing four principle reasons for such 
consideration.  Briefly, the reasons offered are:  (1) the increasing incorporation and 
acceptance of evolutionary psychological theories in the mainstream of psychological 
science, (2) a burgeoning track record of fruitful explanations of criminological phenomena 
(e.g., homicide, theft, drug use, rehabilitation, etc.) by means of evolutionary theories, (3) 
a growing sense that a more pluralistic approach to explanation in the social sciences will 
advance knowledge, and (4) the need to integrate theories of crime and punishment in a 
way that takes better account of biological, psychological, and sociological variables.  The 
authors stated aim for their paper, then, is to “clarify the role of evolutionary explanations 
in criminology with a focus on how evolutionary approaches can be best integrated with 
mainstream criminological approaches” (p. 5).  While acknowledging that many social 
scientists remain skeptical as to the viability of evolutionary explanations of behavior, 
Durrant and Ward (2012) claim that the key question at hand is “not whether evolutionary 
theory is relevant to an understanding of human behavior” (p. 8) but rather what role 
evolutionary accounts have to play in legitimate social science theorizing.  
According to these authors, an adequate evolutionary understanding of the origins 
and nature of criminal behavior presumes not only that the physical characteristics of 
human beings have evolved through processes of natural and sexual selection, but that our 
psychological and, consequently, cultural characteristics did so as well (see also Roach & 
Pease, 2011).  Thus, because of our evolutionary history, we possess a number of both Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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domain general and domain specific evolved psychological mechanisms that provide us with 
the capacity to use language, create and develop a wide diversity of cultural forms of life, 
engage in meaningful social and political relationships, and construct environments for 
subsequent generations that can then, in turn, shape human genetic and cultural evolution.  
In this model, the conceptual bridge that connects the fundamentally biological processes of 
Darwinian natural selection to the interpersonal vagaries and complexities of contemporary 
psychological life, as well as, ultimately, to the shaping of cultural life for untold generations 
to come, is the “evolved psychological mechanism” (and its presumed causal powers). 
We will contend, however, that the search for “evolved psychological mechanisms” 
that can adequately account for either the transmission of psychological entities (i.e., 
emotions, intentions, ideas, behaviors, etc.) across generations or the current existence of 
such entities cannot in principle succeed.  Thus, these authors are doomed to fail in their 
attempt to offer a viably scientific explanation of human criminal behavior, as are all other 
like-minded evolutionary psychologists who seek to do much the same thing with all sorts of 
other human behaviors.  Because evolutionary psychological theories fundamentally rely on 
the metaphor of mechanism – rather than on actual mechanisms – such theories cannot 
justifiably be employed to draw the sorts of causal inferences that evolutionary 
psychologists wish to make regarding the origins and nature of human behavior (Gantt, 
Melling, & Reber, in press).  Indeed, we argue that for the most part evolutionary 
psychologists (in this particular case Durrant and Ward) consistently confuse their 
metaphors for mechanisms, and in so doing ultimately render explanations of human 
behavior that are not only uninformative but also unscientific. 
A Brief Bit of History 
Though seldom noted in popular accounts of the rise and eventual near-universal 
acceptance of Darwinian theory in the biological sciences (as well as in the larger Western 
culture), Darwin’s ground-breaking explanation of the origins of species by means of natural 
selection struggled to gain full acceptance in the scientific community of his day.  There Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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was, as many early critics (both in and out of the biological sciences) noted – and, indeed, 
Darwin himself readily acknowledged – a serious problem with the theory insofar as it did 
not adequately provide for the actual physical mechanism by which rising generations 
inherited the various physical traits of preceding generations.  That is, while Darwin argued 
that those physical traits of an organism that make it more likely to survive and successfully 
reproduce become more common in a population over successive generations via processes 
of natural selection, such processes were by themselves insufficient to fully account for the 
transmission of said characteristics.  Indeed, as much subsequent research over the last 
century has shown, natural selection is really only one of the four fundamental forces of 
biological evolution – genetic drift, gene flow, and random mutation constituting the other 
three (see Barton, Briggs, Eisen, Goldstein, & Patel, 2007).  Thus, while Darwinian natural 
selection might instigate the process by which physical characteristics are transmitted from 
one generation to another in species, without a clear empirical or material referent of some 
sort, the question of exactly how such characteristics were in fact “transmitted” remained a 
mystery, and the basic notion of “survival of the fittest” merely a potentially fruitful 
metaphor.
1 
  Interestingly, the difficulty that Darwin and his intellectual descendants experienced 
in addressing this knotty explanatory problem actually led to a perceptible decline in the 
popularity of Darwin’s theory in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries (see Bowler, 2003).  
Indeed, some of Darwin’s critics were fully convinced that the problem of the actual 
mechanics of transmission was so serious that it constituted a fatal flaw from which the 
theory could not hope to recover.  Thus, contrary to the popular impression that Darwinian 
theories took the scientific world by storm and swept away all competitors almost 
                                                           
1 For a detailed account of the reception of Darwin’s work, and the intellectual debates surrounding it 
in both the 19
th and 20
th centuries, see Peter J. Bowler’s (2003) Evolution:  The History of an Idea and 
Edward J. Larson’s (2004) Evolution:  The Remarkable History of a Scientific Theory.  For a more 
intimate description of how Darwin himself handled the various philosophical, theological, and 
scientific objections to his work see Adrian Desmond and James Moore (1991), Darwin:  The Life of a 
Tormented Evolutionist. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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immediately upon the publication of The Origins of Species, there were in fact a variety of 
other scientifically respectable theories – at least according to the science of the day – that 
were being hotly debated in the decades following Darwin’s initial proposal, all equally eager 
to identify the missing mechanical link of evolution (e.g., Saltationism, Orthogenesis, Neo-
Lamarckism, etc.).
2  Interestingly, although it is commonly assumed that the rediscovery of 
Mendel’s laws of genetic inheritance at the beginning of the 20
th century provided the 
immediate conceptual support Darwin’s theory required, Mendel’s work was actually first put 
forth as an alternative to Darwinism (Bowler, 2003).  Indeed, it was not until the 1930’s 
that the two theories were finally brought into accord whereby genetic inheritance was seen 
as providing the actual material mechanism for and scientifically acceptable solution to 
Darwin’s transmission and selection problem (Larson, 2004).   
The “modern synthesis” of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian selection theory was 
primarily brought about in Fisher’s (1930) book The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection.  
In this work, Fisher successfully challenged the common scientific thinking of his day by 
arguing that Mendelian genetics and Darwinian natural selection were not only compatible, 
but in fact were both required in order to make adequate sense of evolution.  As philosopher 
of science John Dupre (2003) has recently noted, “the result today is a richly articulated 
causal theory” in which “natural selection remains by far the most powerful – according to 
many the only – theory that provides an explanation of the adaptation of organisms to their 
environments” (p. 19).  The linchpin that accounts for the modern rise of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory from being just one among many competing scientific theories of 
evolution in the early part of the 20
th century – and a troubled one at that – to being almost 
universally embraced in the biological sciences today was Mendel’s discovery of the gene 
and R. A. Fisher’s subsequent deft weaving of the work of both Mendel and Darwin into one 
                                                           
2 Indeed, it is indicative of the intellectual climate of the early part of the last century to note that one 
of the most popular biology textbooks of the 1930s, Dynamic Biology, only mentioned Darwinian 
evolutionary theory near the end of the book and concluded that “Darwin’s theory, like that of 
Lamarck, is no longer generally accepted” (May, 1984, p. 307; cited in Witham, 2002, p. 153). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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viable conceptual whole.  Ultimately, it was the gene that served as the empirically 
demonstrable material referent necessary for transforming heredity by natural selection 
from merely being an intriguing metaphor into a verifiable mechanism.  Once coupled with a 
clear material referent like the gene, natural selection was accepted as a properly 
mechanical means by which functional explanations of physical phenomena and events 
could be offered in science, and, thereby, became a powerful explanatory approach in the 
biological sciences.  Absent a clear material referent, however, explanations invoking 
natural selection alone are rightly subject to considerable doubt, as the historical example of 
Darwin’s theory makes clear. 
  What the brief historical analysis here suggests is that there is a strong precedent for 
questioning theories that lack a material referent or physical mechanism to account for 
observed phenomena.  For this reason, perhaps we should take a closer look at the nature 
and viability of the proposed “evolved psychological mechanisms” that constitute a central 
conceptual conceit of Durrant and Ward’s (2012) evolutionary approach to explanation in 
criminology.  Durrant and Ward (2012) identify the notion that “humans possess a number 
of both domain general and domain specific psychological mechanisms” as one of three 
foundational assumptions that form the basis of evolutionary behavioral science and which, 
thereby, “allow us to talk sensibly about an evolved human nature” (p. 8).  Presumably, the 
existence of the sorts of psychological mechanisms these authors propose “allow us to talk 
sensibly about an evolved human nature” because such mechanisms qua mechanisms allow 
us to identify the underlying causal origins of human conduct.  Sensibly, in this sense then, 
means efficient causal – a common mode of scientific explanation in both contemporary 
natural and social science (Bishop, 2007), and certainly the mode preferred by evolutionary 
psychologists (Menuge, 2004; Tallis, 2011).
3  However, this very claim raises a few 
                                                           
3 This is not to say, however, that such is the best or only mode of explanation.  However, a detailed 
analysis of alternative modes of explanation and understanding in the natural and social sciences is 
well beyond the scope of the present paper.  The interested reader is referred to works by Bishop 
(2007), Cornwell (2004), Hiley, Bohman, and Shusterman (1991), Illari, Russo, and Williamson Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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important questions:  Do explanations invoking “psychological mechanisms,” evolved or 
otherwise, in fact allow us to talk sensibly – that is, scientifically (i.e., in strictly material 
and efficient causal terms) – about human nature and behavior?  Or, is talk of psychological 
mechanisms and their presumed causal efficacy really just talk that has been hypnotized by 
the vibrancy of a widely accepted metaphor, and which, as such, does not allow for any 
genuinely causal trajectories to be drawn between the distinct ontological domains of 
biology and psychology? 
Mechanisms and Metaphors 
The complex role that metaphor has played in the history of scientific theorizing, in 
general, and in the theorizing of the social sciences, in particular, has been explored in 
great detail by a number of scholars (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Hallyn, 2000; Leary, 1990).  
Although there are significant differences of opinion among these scholars regarding the 
nature, utility, and proper role of metaphor in scientific theorizing, there is nonetheless a 
fairly solid agreement that while metaphors are an inescapable feature of all scientific 
theorizing, they in no way constitute the material or empirical referents necessary to 
support the sorts of mechanical and casual explanations that many scientists wish to make 
using them.  Indeed, the very concept of mechanism present in so many psychological 
explanations of thought and behavior – and which is a hallmark of most evolutionary 
psychological explanations – is itself a metaphor (Leary, 1990).  A mechanism is, after all, 
simply a physical object of one sort or another, a piece of machinery designed to transform 
input forces and movement into a desired set of output forces and movement (Uicker, 
Pennock, & Shigley, 2011).  As such, then, a mechanism is most often just one piece of a 
larger process or mechanical system (e.g., the winding mechanism of a clock, the hinge 
mechanism of a door, etc.). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2011), and Trigg (2001) for more detailed treatments of the question of explanation in the natural 
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Granted, the term mechanism has come to be used – especially by psychologists – in 
a much more conceptually expansive way than merely as a reference to some specific 
material entity or device for facilitating the transfer of forces and movement (Norkus, 
2005).  Since Descartes first introduced the metaphor of mechanism in the 17
th century, 
and later psychologists took up the metaphor as foundational to a science of “mental 
mechanics” (Leary, 1990, p. 17), we have come to invoke all manner of psychological 
mechanisms, behavioral mechanisms, societal mechanisms, intrapsychic mechanisms, and 
mechanisms of cultural transmission and transformation in our attempts to account for a 
vast array of individual acts and interpersonal events (Norkus, 2005).  However, this simply 
reflects an instance of disciplinary over-reach, wherein the viable concepts from one science 
(i.e., Engineering), concerned with one ontological realm (i.e., the physical), are 
misappropriated for service in an entirely different science (i.e., Psychology) concerned with 
an entirely different ontological realm (i.e., the psychological and sociocultural).  This 
blurring of conceptual boundaries happens because of a disciplinary tendency to uncritically 
allow our metaphors to concretize and then get away from us.  The psyche – contrary to 
some elaborate attempts to paint it as such – is not in fact a physical thing and, thus, is not 
the sort of thing populated by, constituted of, or originating in mechanisms (Robinson, 
2009; see also Gantt, Melling, and Reber, in press).  Of course, this is not to say that the 
psyche is fundamentally independent of the physicality or mechanicity of the brain – only 
that the psyche is not identical with or adequately reducible to the physics of the brain.  As 
such, then, there is no such thing as a materially real or empirically-verifiable psychological 
mechanism (Tallis, 2011).  Indeed, the term itself is little more than a conceptual 
oxymoron, and, therefore, not a viable explanatory construct for any psychology that seeks 
to ground itself in either the materialist metaphysics of evolutionary theory or the positivist 
philosophy of contemporary natural science. 
Ironically, it is one of evolutionary psychology’s most ardent advocates who (perhaps 
unintentionally) provides an important caution concerning the explanatory viability of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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evolved psychological mechanisms.  Daniel Dennett (1995), in his book Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea:  Evolution and the Meanings of Life, famously distinguished between “skyhooks” and 
“cranes” as a means of judging the plausibility of scientific explanations, particularly 
Darwinian explanations of speciation, life, and meaning. Dennett (1995) quotes the Oxford 
English Dictionary, which defines a skyhook as “an imaginary contrivance for attachment to 
the sky” or “an imaginary means of suspension in the sky.”  Dennett (1995) writes: 
The skyhook concept is perhaps a descendant of the deus ex machina of ancient 
Greek dramaturgy:  when second-rate playwrights found their plots leading their 
heroes into inescapable difficulties, they were often tempted to crank down a god 
onto the scene, like Superman, to save the situation supernaturally. . . .  Skyhooks 
would be wonderful things to have, great for lifting unwieldy objects out of difficult 
circumstances, and speeding up all sorts of construction projects.  Sad to say, they 
are impossible.  (p. 74) 
  In sharp contrast to the “impossible” (i.e., magical) powers of a skyhook, Dennett 
(1995) argues:  
Cranes can do the lifting work our imaginary skyhooks might do, and they do it in an 
honest, non-question-begging fashion.  They are expensive, however.  They have to 
be designed and built, from everyday parts already on hand, and they have to be 
located on a firm base of existing ground.  Skyhooks are miraculous lifters, 
unsupported and insupportable.  Cranes are no less excellent as lifters, and they 
have the decided advantage of being real. . . .  It is time for some more careful 
definitions.  Let us understand that a skyhook is a "mind-first" force or power or 
process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent design, is 
ultimately the result of mindless, motiveless mechanicity.  A crane, in contrast, is a 
subprocess or special feature of a design process that can be demonstrated to permit 
the local speeding up of the basic, slow process of natural selection, and that can be Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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demonstrated to be itself the predictable (or retrospectively explicable) product of 
the basic process.  (pp. 74-75) 
  Here we can see Dennett’s recognition
4 that the only sorts of explanations that 
should count for the evolutionary theorist as being properly scientific are those that directly 
connect events in the world to those material conditions which are capable of producing 
them.  And Dennett (1995) argues that Darwin’s idea of natural selection, coupled with 
Mendelian genetics, provides an account that is grounded in precisely this way.  According 
to Dennett, explanations that are not grounded in material, efficient causal processes are 
ultimately “skyhooks” and not cranes. 
  Obviously, there is nothing whatsoever wrong with postulating the existence of as-
yet-undiscovered mechanisms of change or the tendering hypotheses that call for close 
empirical examination.  There is, likewise, nothing inherently wrong with employing a 
metaphor drawn from everyday common experience in one’s attempt to make sense of 
complex and difficult phenomena.  Such is, in many ways, key to the entire scientific 
enterprise, especially in social sciences (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Leary, 1990).  The problem 
here is that attempts to offer evolutionary accounts of the origins and nature of human 
behavior, such as those proposed by Durrant and Ward, can never rise above the 
metaphorical because they are in principle trying to account for phenomena (intentions, 
desires, emotions, perspectives, thoughts, interpretations, etc.) which have no direct 
material – and, therefore, no genuinely mechanical – causal referents.
5   
Because there is no clear material or efficient causal referent to the metaphor of a 
psychological mechanism, explanations invoking psychological mechanisms are simply 
                                                           
4 Sadly, this recognition is one that Dennett himself all-too-frequently forgets, particularly in his 
accounts of the evolutionary origins of such human phenomena as consciousness, moral agency and 
religion (see, e.g., Dennett, 1991, 2003, 2006). 
5 Again, as noted above, this is not to say that material reality is not a condition for the existence of 
psychological traits or social life, but rather only that psychological phenomena can never be 
adequately or sufficiently reduced to or explained by material reality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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examples of assuming that a “skyhook” can do the heavy lifting of actual scientific 
explanation.  The psychological mechanisms that Durrant and Ward (2012) claim constitute 
a key explanatory necessity of an evolutionary account of criminology cannot (in principle) 
be “demonstrated to be themselves the predictable (or retrospectively explicable) product of 
the basic [biological] processes” of Mendelian genetics.  As Uicker, Pennock, and Shigley 
(2011) note in their widely respected textbook on the fundamentals of mechanical 
engineering, mechanisms – as parts of larger mechanical systems – require direct links that 
“must be connected together in some manner to transmit motion from the driver, or input 
motion, to the follower, or output” (p. 8; italics in the original).  Absent such direct 
connecting links, the mechanism does not exist as a mechanism and cannot serve any 
genuinely mechanical or causal function.  Thus, the metaphor of the mechanism breaks 
down in evolutionary psychological explanations of behavior precisely because no such 
direct connecting linkage between the physical and the psychological can be either rationally 
or empirically established.
6  And, further complicating the explanatory project of 
evolutionary psychology, is the fact that no direct causal link between any specific human 
act and the psychological mechanism(s) presumably responsible for such act can be drawn 
either. 
To presume that invoking a psychological mechanism, evolved or otherwise, provides 
an adequate account for the origins and nature of a given psychological phenomenon is to 
erroneously assume that no significant gap exists between the realm of the truly mechanical 
and material and the immaterial realm of the psychological and social.  It is to assume that 
material conditions and processes can create psychological entities (i.e., psychological 
mechanisms) which, while profoundly other than material in terms of their essence, 
functioning, and manifestation, nonetheless retain all those material qualities that would 
                                                           
6 Indeed, as Tallis (2011), Bennett and Hacker (2003), Beauregard and O’Leary (2008), Legrenzi and 
Umilta (2011), and Robinson (2008) have all convincingly demonstrated, the clearest and most 
compelling logical and empirical evidence we have is quite simply that mind is not brain, nor can it be 
adequately derived from brain. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
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allow for the efficient causal production of events in the world.  What began as the 
metaphor of the mechanism has now become the mechanism itself! 
Ultimately, evolutionary psychological metaphors also fail to provide compelling 
functional explanations of human behavior (Buller, 2005; Richardson, 2007).  They 
demonstrate neither the mathematical cogency of quantitative genetics nor the parsimony 
and predictive power of operant conditioning (see Gantt, Melling, & Reber, in press).  They 
also lack the conceptual origins of a material and mechanistic analog like the computing 
machine and fail to clearly intimate potential material referents in the brain that may 
eventually support a properly mechanistic account of the phenomenon (Tallis, 2011).  Thus, 
evolutionary psychological accounts of culture, social behavior and psychological life – 
despite the prevalent and accepted rhetorical use of mechanical terms – originate in and 
allude to immaterial and non-mechanistic human phenomena and experiences, and, as 
such, are far removed from the material referents and mechanistic analogs necessary to 
mechanistic or functional explanatory force. 
Conclusion 
In the end, then, the “evolved psychological mechanisms” which evolutionary 
psychologists like Durrant and Ward assume to be central keys to adequate explanation of 
human behavior are in fact not mechanisms at all, but mechanical metaphors that remain 
metaphors no matter how much one might wish to imbue them with necessary causal power 
or hope they possess actual material reality.  Indeed, and perhaps most significantly for the 
case we are making here, a central basic claim of Durrant and Ward’s proposed evolutionary 
approach to criminology – that is, that any adequate explanation of human criminal 
behavior must assume the existence and operation of certain evolved psychological 
mechanisms – lacks scientific merit because there are no such things as psychological 
mechanisms, expect in the most metaphorical sense.  As demonstrated above, a 
mechanism is a bit of machinery, an assemblage of moving parts, a system of material 
components operating in sequence or in conjunction, or a material linkage or ordered Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology                                                                       Commentary  
Special Edition, January, 2012, Vol 4 (1):46-53        Gantt &Thayne 
 
58 
 
sequence of events in a biological, chemical, or physical process.  Thus, to speak of a 
“psychological mechanism” is to employ a metaphor to make what is at best a tenuous 
comparison between the characteristics and operations of two fundamentally distinct 
ontological realms (i.e., the psychological or cultural and the physical).  And to speak of an 
“evolved psychological mechanism” is to speak nonsense, insofar as mechanisms are 
material things, not psychological ones, and psychological things do not evolve – except, 
again, in a purely metaphorical sense.  Ultimately, however, evolutionary metaphors, no 
matter how seductive, intriguing, or persistently or confidently employed, cannot sustain 
the heavy conceptual weight required of the sorts of scientific explanation to which 
evolutionary psychologists aspire. 
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